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1. Introduction
Delimitation of national law and EU law and the proper qualification of ‘purely national situations’ has been a
consistent source of questioning, leading up to an important body of case-law in all fields of EU law (again recently
illustrated by the McCarthy case in relation to movement of EU citizens) [1]. Two recurrent questions are where to draw
the line and at what level, EU or national, this divide should best be determined. In EU competition law this topic was early
on identified and tackled by the CJEU. In VÃ¶lk , the CJEU held that a restriction of competition must be
‘appreciable’ for it to be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU [ 2]. Accordingly, where the market share to the parties is
‘insignificant’ on the relevant market concerned by the agreement, the alleged restriction will fall outside the scope
of the provision. This is so irrespective of whether this agreement would have been deemed to violate Article 101(1) TFEU
by its very nature (i.e. by object), as in the case of a ‘naked’ price-fixing agreement or one giving absolute
territorial protection to a distributor; or by effect [3]. This judge-made doctrine can be said to mirror a condition explicitly set
out in Article 102 TFEU, pursuant to which an abuse of a dominant position must take place in a ‘substantial part’
of the internal market if it is to be subject to the prohibition.
The VÃ¶lk  judgment inspired a series of Notices on agreements of minor importance (de minimis) by the Commission,
the latest version of which was adopted in 2001 [4]. The purpose of these instruments is to set out in advance the
circumstances in which an agreement is, in the view of the EU competition authority, unlikely to have an appreciable effect
on competition. Unlike the judgment from which it is inspired, however, the 2001 Notice does not provide guidance
regarding the status of agreements that have the potential to restrict competition by object and is therefore limited to
agreements that can be presumed to generate efficiency gains [5]. One can see many different, policy-related, reasons
why the Commission is reluctant to declare ex ante in a soft law instrument that it will not be prosecuting some of the most
egregious and harmful restrictions [6].
With the decentralised enforcement of Article 101 TFEU made possible with - and indeed favoured by - the entry into force
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of Regulation 1/2003 [7] and the accompanying soft law instruments, one could have predicted that the de minimis
doctrine would play a significant jurisdictional role alongside the ‘effect on trade between Member States’
condition [8]. To the extent that it defines the scope of Article 101 TFEU, the doctrine can be seen as the expression of a
dividing line between the respective boundaries of national and EU competition law. One can indeed presume that the
threshold of ‘appreciability’ will be a lower one in the case of the former, and that national competition authorities
(hereinafter, ‘NCAs’) and, more generally, that national courts will be required to deal more often than the
Commission with agreements of relatively ‘minor importance’ [ 9]. This is a first reason why an overview of the
application of the de minimis doctrine in the different Member States in the past years is a valuable exercise for academics
and practitioners alike.
The generalised enforcement of Article 101 TFEU at the national level can also contribute significantly to the
understanding of the doctrine in its practical implementation which is to a large extent still ignored. As pointed out above, it
is undisputed that potential restrictions of competition by object may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU
altogether pursuant to the de minimis doctrine. At the same time, the 2001 Commission Notice does not provide guidance
in this regard, and the case law is not particularly illuminating either [10]. To the extent that NCAs and national courts
benefit from a greater exposure to agreements in which the doctrine is likely to be at stake, the task of defining the
necessary level of ‘appreciability’ to trigger the application of Article 101 TFEU seems to be more effectively
performed at the Member States’ level.
In a different vein, an analysis of the application of the de minimis doctrine is useful to assess the extent to which EU
competition law is consistently applied in the different Member States. The Commission justified the elimination of the
notification system of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on grounds that, 40 years of law enforcement had greatly clarified the
substantive scope of these provisions [11]. The risk that the decentralisation in the enforcement of the law could lead to
contradictory interpretations across the EU was addressed by means of several mechanisms enshrined in Regulation
1/2003, and which placed the Commission at the top of a network of enforcement authorities (‘European Competition
Network’, or ‘ECN’) [ 12].
And finally, it is interesting to examine how EU competition law influences the shaping of equivalent national regimes. The
database of 65 case reports draws its examples not only from case law, administrative practice, and legislative initiatives
from Member States, but also from that of third countries (e.g. Croatia, Macedonia,Turkey) which have taken active steps
to bring their systems in line with EU competition law.
A close reading of the different articles reveals that the de minimis doctrine has acquired a life of its own at the national
level, in the sense that it plays a relevant role in areas that go beyond its original scope of application. Thus similar
principles are now relied upon by NCAs to exclude from serious scrutiny mergers and acquisitions that would otherwise
fall under the scope of national regimes for reason that they have only insignificant effects on competition on the Member
State in question. This appears to be the case, most notably, in the British [13] and the German [14] merger control
systems.
There is also a different context in which the de minimis doctrine has acquired prominence at the EU level. Even though
there was no case law explicitly or implicitly supporting such policy initiatives, the European Commission adopted a
Notice, then superseded by a block exemption regulation, identifying the instances in which aid granted by Member States
is unlikely to fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, either because it does not ‘distort competition’ within the
meaning of that provision, or because it does not ‘affect trade between Member States’. The latest version of the
Regulation was adopted in 2006. [15] Pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 2(2), Member States are dispensed from the
notification requirement for aid below the amount of EUR 200,000 for a period of three years. The fact that de minimis
doctrine has been invoked before national courts in State aid cases – there are two cases in the sample examined
below – is evidence of the prominence gained by this discipline in the past decade.
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2. Digest of the 65 case reports
This foreword draws on a sample of over 60 online articles, published in the past six years on the e-competitions
newsletter, in which the de minimis doctrine was a relevant factor in (i) court or administrative proceedings, or (ii) in the
context of a legislative process. It is useful to provide a detailed breakdown of the subject-matter of each of the articles,
which can be categorised as follows:   29 address the application of the de minimis doctrine to Article 101 TFEU and its
national equivalent.   13 deal with the application of the doctrine by analogy in the field of merger control.   11 comment on
general legislative developments at the national level involving, in one way or the other, the appreciability of restrictions of
competition.   5 discuss on specific developments addressing the de minimis doctrine, whether in the field of merger
control or concerning the application of Article 101 TFEU.   5 concern the role of the de minimis doctrine in the field of
State aid, of which only three concern developments at the national level.   Finally, two articles comment on legislative
developments at the EU level.
Or to put it in graphics:
  
A particular emphasis will be placed on the analysis of the 29 cases addressing the application of the de minimis doctrine
to agreements between undertakings (Section 3). The three cases interpreting Article 107 TFEU and the de minimis block
exemption regulation in the field of State aid, in turn, are only briefly discussed (Section 4).
3. Restrictive agreements and the de minimis doctrine
In the light of the cases examined, and from a general perspective, a first issue is how the de minimis doctrine is perceived
and applied in national proceedings, on the one hand, and replicated in national legislation, on the other (section
3.1).There are indeed several technical and institutional reasons why it would be wrong to assume that the principles of
the de minimis Notice would be necessarily endorsed at the national level. But also two distinctly complex technical
aspects emerge, related to the application to the doctrine. All restrictions of competition must be appreciable for them to
be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, irrespective of whether they are potentially restrictive by object or by effect. Considering
that the de minimis Notice issued by the European Commission only provides guidance in the latter case, it appears that
confusion in this regard is difficult to exclude at the outset (section 3.2). Similarly, and insofar as the application of the
doctrine requires by its very nature that the relevant market is defined, the complications and fallacies that this exercise
entails by definition can be expected to arise, in particular when national courts examine the ‘appreciability’ of a
restraint (section 3.3).
3.1. Role and prominence of the de minimis doctrine at the national level
3.1.1. The de minimis doctrine before national courts
A reading of the case reports suggests that national courts and NCAs are familiar with the de minimis doctrine. If this
should not come as a surprise in the case of the latter, it cannot be automatically presumed that national courts have the
ability and the willingness to consider its implications in competition law proceedings. National courts are typically
composed of generalist judges who do not always have the expertise or the inclination to address the technicalities of EU
competition law. In addition, one has to consider that the de minimis doctrine is truly practicable and visible through the
application of the principles deriving from the successive Notices issued by the Commission. It is difficult to rule out that
some national judges will prove reluctant to endorse the principles issued by an administrative authority, as was illustrated
in the past with reference to some national rulings in which such reluctance was made very explicit [16].
Against this background, it is reassuring to note, first of all, that the de minimis doctrine appears to be well integrated in
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the analysis of national courts. Interestingly, in some of the judgments this doctrine is only considered as a routine step in
the assessment of competition restrictions (the ‘appreciability’ step). By this it is meant that it was apparent from
the facts of the case that the market position of the parties to the agreement was far from ‘insignificant’ [ 17].
The incorporation of the doctrine in the ‘default’ analysis of national courts may be the consequence, at least in
part, of the fact that it tends to be raised and become relevant in relatively well-defined factual scenarios that arise
recurrently, often at the EU level. One is not surprised to find some cases concerning beer supply agreements [18] and
petrol stations [19], which have long found their way to the CJEU by means of preliminary references. Some issues
become recurrent only in one Member State, which means that expertise is developed at the local level. The two
judgments from Austrian courts for instance concern the status under Article 101 TFEU of the so-called ‘radius
clauses’, which are in essence non-compete obligations imposed by the owners of shopping centres on shop tenants,
and which according to the correspondents have given rise to a long saga of cases in the country [20]. There is also a
significant number of cases involving resale price maintenance in the case reports, namely 4 [21], the restrictive nature of
which has always been undisputed [22]. One could speculate whether it is more likely to find such clauses in vertical
agreements concluded by relatively small firms either because these market players are less familiar with competition law
or because they can reasonably anticipate that competition authorities are less likely to take action against them.
The status of the 2001 Notice was discussed at length in the appeal before the Cour dâ€™appel de Paris  against the
French NCA decision in SNCF/Expedia [23]. At first sight, upon reading that the national court stated that the NCA was not
bound by the de minimis Notice, one could suppose that the court was taking the reluctant attitude hinted at above. A
detailed analysis of the judgment reveals, however, a deep understanding of the logic of the Notice and a willingness to
incorporate its principles in the assessment. The court held that, unlike the appellant, the NCA had rightly considered that
the de minimis Notice and its national equivalent in French law are, first and foremost, instruments providing guidance
about the criteria that a competition authority may use to define its enforcement priorities [24], and not (as the appellant
had suggested) binding opinions interpreting the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.
3.1.2. The role and prominence of de minimis doctrine in national competition law
The de minimis doctrine has also been considered in the context of the preparation of new national systems adjusting to
the demands of Regulation 1/2003. In 2008, when the Bulgarian Parliament adopted new competition legislation, the de
minimis market share thresholds were altered to bring them in line with those laid down in the 2001 Commission Notice [
25]. A similar amendment was introduced in Romanian law in 2010 [26]. The amendment to the Competition Act circulated
by the Czech competition authority sought to change the legal technique through which de minimis agreements are left
outside the national equivalent to Article 101 TFEU so that it reflects the logic followed by the Commission [27].
Two of the case reports discuss the reform of the Spanish competition law system initiated in 2007. Article 1 of the 2008
Regulation implementing the main lines of the Competition Act addresses the status of agreements of minor importance,
and does so by reproducing the essence of the 2001 Notice [28]. The wording chosen by the Spanish legislator is
somewhat confusing insofar as it can be interpreted as meaning that the de minimis doctrine does not apply to object
restrictions, thereby contradicting the VÃ¶lk case. It is submitted that this confusion is the result of codifying into
legislation an instrument originally serving a different purpose. As will be discussed below, in any event, subsequent
enforcement activity has dissipated any fears about the substantive implications of the ambiguous wording chosen.
A similar constructive attitude can be observed on the part of competition authorities. The German Bundeskartellamt
issued in 2007 a new de minimis instrument in which it brought the relevant market share thresholds at the level of those
chosen by the Commission [29]. The pattern observed in individual cases show how young competition authorities (in
particular relative to the German one) build on the experience developed at the EU level. In 2000, the Spanish competition
authority took the view that an agreement fell, on de minimis grounds, outside the prohibition laid down in national law,
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and this at a time when the doctrine had not been formally enshrined in legislation [30]. The following year, thus even
before the country joined the EU, the Maltese competition authority relied in part on de minimis-based arguments to
exempt an agreement under the local equivalent of Article 101 TFEU [31].
3.1.3. The de minimis doctrine in third countries
The de minimis doctrine has perhaps more surprisingly been incorporated as part of the acquis communautaire in third
countries in many different ways. When competition legislation was being reformed in 2008 in the Turkish Parliament, an
amendment explicitly introduced the de minimis doctrine [32]. In December 2005, the Swiss competition authority adopted
a Notice in the field clearly inspired from that issued by the European Commission [33].
A handful of decisions taken by third-country authorities are indicative of the degree of influence of EU competition law on
these regimes, often in a pre-accession logic. A 2008 decision taken by the Croatian Competition Authority, which involved
resale price maintenance, was examined in the light of the relevant EU law precedents, and this included the applicability
of the de minimis doctrine to the restraints at stake [34]. A 2009 decision of the Macedonian competition authority
excluded the applicability of the doctrine to a horizontal agreement on account of the (relatively limited) market share of
the parties [35].
3.2. Restrictions by object and the de minimis doctrine
As one could have predicted, national competition authorities regularly apply the de minimis doctrine to potential
restrictions of competition by object. For instance, the Hungarian NCA found that an agreement providing for resale price
maintenance clauses did not have an appreciable impact on competition [36]. In 2009, the Spanish competition authority
closed a similar case after finding that the market share of the supplier imposing prices on its distributors was below 1% [
37]. There are even some examples of horizontal agreements that are found to be de minimis. The Turkish competition
authority concluded that a price-fixing agreement between 12 bread manufacturers in the mid-sized town of Bergama,
which was found to form the relevant geographic market, did not appreciably restrict competition [38]. In December 2007,
the Belgian competition authority reached the same conclusion regarding an opening hours’ scheme implemented by
a group of local pharmacists [39].
The understanding of the relationship between object restrictions and the de minimis doctrine seems to have evolved and
become more sophisticated over time. The ‘economics-based’ approach favoured by the Commission in recent
years may be one crucial factor explaining this trend. The clarity of the 2001 Notice may be another one. In 1997, for
instance, one could still see the Belgian competition authority holding - in contradiction with the VÃ¶lk judgment - that
the de minimis doctrine does not apply to agreements featuring the so-called ‘hard-core’ restraints [ 40].
It should not come as a surprise that national courts struggle more than competition authorities with this relationship. For
instance, a Dutch court of appeals ruled in October 2009 that the mere fact that the vertical restraint at stake in the case
qualified as a ‘hard-core’ one was sufficient to conclude that it restricted competition in an appreciable manner [ 41
]. In any case, there are several examples showing that national courts are able to distinguish between the
‘appreciability’ test and the qualification of an agreement as restricting competition by object. This seems to be
particularly the case in Member States with a longer competition law tradition. For instance, a 2004 ruling of the Higher
Regional Court of Düsseldorf held that an agreement giving absolute territorial protection to a distributor did not
appreciably restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU insofar as the market share of the supplier in
the case was below 1% [42]. Another interesting judgment was rendered by the Regional Court of Hamburg in December
2007. The case concerned the exclusive agreements for the distribution of a Smartphone device concluded between 
Apple and T-Mobile [43]. To the extent that consumers are unable to ‘unlock’ their device for use in a different
network for a 24-month period, one could have claimed that the agreement was aimed at limiting parallel trade across
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Member States. However, the Regional Court noted that the vertical relationship between the manufacturer and the mobile
operator could not appreciably restrict competition as Apple was a new entrant on the relevant market and its market
share was assumed to be 0% for the purposes of the application of the de minimis doctrine [44].
3.3. Market definition and other technical aspects of the de minimis doctrine
The appropriate assessment of the ‘appreciability’ of a competition restriction may be difficult in practice for a
variety of reasons. Insofar as the de minimis Notice relies on market definition, the familiar problems that are associated
with this exercise can be expected to arise. It is well-known by competition authorities, for instance, that market shares
may be misleading in the so-called ‘bidding markets’, within which competition takes place ‘for’ the
market, as opposed to ‘in’ (or ‘within’) the market [ 45]. The Hungarian NCA was faced with this situation
when it took action against software producers for alleged bid-rigging in tenders for the supply of software to universities.
The agency dismissed allegations that the parties were minor players with a joint market share below 10%. According to
the decision, the practices under examination had had an appreciable impact on the market insofar as software producers
rarely take part in all tenders [46].
Some courts have examined markets in a non-technical sense, or at least in a way that differs from the meaning given in
the past decades. When examining the de minimis nature of a beer supply agreement, a Portuguese court distinguished,
in a 2005 judgment, between an alleged ‘Community-wide market’ and an alleged ‘national market’, and
examined whether the de minimis doctrine applied in the two cases [47]. By doing so, the court seemingly failed to
differentiate between the scope of the relevant market and the effect of the agreement on trade between Member States.
The technique used to define the market was equally questionable. In fact, the court considered the turnover made by the
supplier relative to the size of the HORECA sector as a whole, and not its actual market share on the market for the supply
of beer.
The very logic of the de minimis doctrine favours a tendency on the part of authorities to confuse between the relatively
limited scope of the relevant market in which the agreement is implemented and the weak market position of the parties
therein. While it is clear that the 2001 Notice defines an agreement of minor importance by reference to the latter,
authorities and courts may be tempted to conclude that an agreement qualifies as de minimis in the light of its reduced
scope of application [48]. This confusion is present in the agreement, mentioned above, providing for an opening hours
scheme for pharmacists. It was rightly pointed out in the case report that the fact that the agreement was confined to a
relatively small region does not mean that it necessarily was of ‘minor importance’ within the meaning of the
Notice or equivalent national legislation [49].
An additional complication comes from the impact of networks of agreements on the de minimis nature of any single one
of them. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the 2001 Notice, the relevant market share threshold is brought down to 5% where
there is a risk that the cumulative effect of parallel networks of agreement leads to market foreclosure (more precisely
where parallel networks of similar agreements cover at least 30% of the relevant market). These provisions are particularly
relevant in vertical relationships between producers and retailers in markets where single-branding restraints are
pervasive. In this sense, it is not by chance that beer and petrol supply agreements have already been singled out as
those in which the applicability of the de minimis doctrine is often at stake. The challenge for national courts and
competition authorities in these situations is to distinguish adequately between the extent of the market covered by the
network of agreements concluded by the relevant supplier and the cumulative effect of such network and parallel ones.
The impression one gets from the reports is that the difference between the two is well understood by experienced courts.
In September 2007, a commercial court in Madrid applied the de minimis doctrine to the agreements concluded between 
Galp and its affiliated petrol stations in Spain, on account of the fact that the agreements concluded by the oil producer
only represented 3% of the relevant market [50]. It must be emphasised that petrol supply agreements have been
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particularly contentious in the past decade in Spain, as a result of which local courts are comfortable with the particular
competition law issues arising in such contexts [51]. An equally meticulous assessment was undertaken by the Brussels
Court of Appeals in June 2005 [52]. This judgment is somewhat peculiar, however, if one takes account of the way in
which the Court examined the ‘appreciability’ of the beer supply agreement at stake. Contrary to what the logic of
the VÃ¶lk  doctrine would dictate, it only did so after considering the relevance of the successive vertical block
exemption regulations, and not before. Interestingly moreover, the Court first considered whether the general thresholds
laid down in the successive de minimis Notices (i.e. 15% in the case of the 2001 version) applied, and only then did it go
on to ascertain whether the cumulative impact of parallel networks of single-branding agreements could lead to market
foreclosure (answering in the negative).
4. De minimis State aid
4.1. De minimis State aid before national courts
The two cases commenting on the relevance of the de minimis doctrine in the field of State aid at the national level echo
some of the controversies that the Commission has sought to clarify with the adoption of a notice on the enforcement of
Article 107 TFEU by national courts [53]. The 2001 judgment of the French Council of State addresses the question
whether the notification requirement applies to all measures granting and advantage involving the use of State resources
or whether, instead, it is in addition necessary to show that the measure in question has an impact on trade between
Member States and, at least, threatens to distort competition in the internal market [54]. By taking the view that only
measures fulfilling all conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU are subject to the notification requirement, the Council of
State anticipated the position that would be expressly endorsed by the CJEU to dissipate any remaining confusion in this
sense [55].
A 1999 judgment by a Swedish administrative court [56], the outcome of which is not uncontroversial, raises interesting
questions about the exact role of national judges when examining the interaction between the de minimis instruments and
the procedural requirements stemming from Article 108 TFEU. In this case, the court held that a local authority had
granted aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU by selling a swimming arena below its market price. However, it
considered that, to the extent that the claimant had not shown that aid was above the de minimis threshold, it was not
established that the measure should have been notified in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU. This position seems to
disregard the fact that the de minimis Regulation derogates to the general obligation (stemming from Article 108(3) TFEU)
to notify new aid, as a consequence of which the burden of proof lies in principle with the Member State claiming the
benefit of the exemption, and not with the firm invoking the breach of the obligation [57].
4.2. De minimis State aid before NCAs
NCAs can play an essential role in ensuring the effectiveness of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. With the reform of the
competition law system in 2007, for instance, the Spanish legislator chose to give monitoring and advisory powers in the
field to the new authority [58]. In this same vein, a February 2008 decision of the Romanian NCA shows that a similar
system exists in that country [59]. A set of measures falling within the scope of a block exemption regulation issued by the
Commission were subject to the control of the NCA prior to their implementation.
5. Conclusions
The de minimis doctrine is indispensable in a workable competition system. This need is more apparent at the national
level, as courts and competition authorities are more likely to be regularly exposed to agreements of relatively minor
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importance. The analysis above reveals that the policy approach favoured by the Commission has become the standard in
national competition law systems (including those of European countries), some of which have been amended to bring
them in line with the 2001 Notice. When applying these instruments, NCAs remained faithful to EU principles and practice.
This in itself may be an indicator that coordination and co-operation mechanisms around the ECN are proving effective in
creating (and preserving) a common legal culture. Likewise, the relatively high number of cases brought before national
courts hints at the fact that the private enforcement of EU competition law is progressively becoming a ‘natural’
feature of the system. The technical difficulties observed by courts concerning in particular market definition should come
as no surprise but are well identified and not specifically related to the de minimis doctrine as such.
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